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Introduction
1. The mission was led by DERC Carolyn McAskie, who was supported by
Stephen O’Malley (HEB) and Jahal de Meritens (RCB). Michel Kassa (Head of
Office, OCHA DRC) and Noel Tsekouras (EHI Officer, OCHA DRC)
accompanied the entire mission. Herbert M’Cleod (RC/HC) accompanied the
mission in Kinshasa, Kisangani and Beni.
2. The mission visited Kinshasa on (10-13 October), Kisangani (13-15 October),
Beni (14 October) and Goma (15-16 October) and met with Government,
relevant local authorities, including RCD-Goma and RCD-K/ML, UN agencies,
MONUC, NGOs and donors.
3. The Terms of Reference for the mission are attached as Annex A.
Main Findings and Recommendations
4. The humanitarian crisis in the DRC, particularly in the east, is huge.  Some
estimates indicate that more than two million people have died during the last
four years. More than two million people have been displaced, and access to
many of them is either seriously restricted or impossible. The civilian
population has borne the brunt of the conflict, and has suffered enormously.
The humanitarian community works in a dangerous and volatile environment,
often characterized by harassment, denial of access and evacuations.  
5. The situation in eastern DRC has become increasingly complex and
fragmented since the departure of the Rwandan and Ugandan troops. In many
parts of Maniema, North and South Kivu, RCD - Goma troops have been
replaced by Mayi Mayi fighters, with whom the humanitarian community has
had little contact. The ongoing conflicts between the Mayi Mayi and the RCD-
Goma have resulted in reductions in humanitarian access in many areas, and
there is a risk that the already fragile humanitarian situation will deteriorate
even further if this is not addressed. It is imperative that the humanitarian
community acts quickly to develop contacts with the Mayi Mayi leaders, and
engages with them in a principled manner, while preserving clear and
transparent working relations with the RCD-Goma.
6. In Ituri, the situation continues to worsen.  The Hema and Lendu ethnic groups
(fuelled by their respective allies) are locked in a cycle of violence and
retribution.  Humanitarian access has been severely restricted in the area
around Bunia, and displacement as a result of violence continues to increase.
Every necessary political action must be taken to arrest the cycle of violence
before a new wave of massacres occurs.  The situation goes to the heart of
OCHA’s advocacy role, and OCHA must help to galvanize the international
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community to address the problem and ensure that there is full understanding
of the complexity of the situation and the need for action. 
7. The new situation requires an intensified response from the humanitarian
community. Humanitarian actions must increase to meet the new challenges.
This will require UN agencies and NGOs to increase staff and programmes,
and donors to be generous and quick in response to funding requests. 
8. Following consultations with donors and agencies, the restructuring of
humanitarian coordination in the DRC is ongoing.  OCHA has taken over the
role of Provincial Coordinator in North Kivu, and will do the same in South Kivu
and Orientale as soon as newly recruited international staff arrive. However,
the rapidly increasing needs in eastern DRC require OCHA to take every
possible step to expedite the recruitment and deployment of new staff and to
procure the equipment necessary for them to do their job.  There is also a
need to take immediate measures to reinforce our under-staffed OCHA DRC
team while recruitment is ongoing.  Surge capacity mechanisms should be
activated towards this end. The need for an Information Officer in Kinshasa is
critical, as is the need for an experienced Humanitarian Affairs Officer to
support efforts in the field.
9. There is also a need to take a more strategic approach to addressing the
rapidly changing situation. UN agencies, NGOs and donors need to form a
small core group to ensure that this approach is developed and disseminated
within the broader humanitarian community, somewhat like a field-based IASC
core group linked to a Donor Contact Group. Herbert M’cleod has begun
discussions on this approach in Kinshasa, and a similar setup is envisioned in
the east.
10. MONUC and the UN agencies have continued to improve their co-operation on
the subject of DDRRR and have developed a Joint Operational Plan. DDRRR
programmes are integrated into the 2003 CAP. However, the DDRRR
operation has barely begun on the ground and problems will inevitably arise. It
would be useful to reconstitute the DRC Task Force at Headquarters (chaired
by DPKO) to ensure that New York remains closely engaged with this issue. 
11. It will be important to keep the regional implications in mind while following the
developments in the DRC. The events of the last few weeks have already had
consequences in Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda.  Our OCHA offices will need
to remain in close touch with one another, including the Regional Support
Office (RSO) in Nairobi. The RSO’s steering committee will be a useful
mechanism for ensuring that the RCs in the region remain abreast of
developments within the region, can discuss the possible implications and
agree on joint responses if necessary.
12. The recommendations of the mission are as follows:
It is imperative to begin negotiations on access to Mayi Mayi-held areas. This
will require careful steps to establish the credibility and trustworthiness of
range of interlocutors with whom we have had little contact.  At the same time
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we will need to maintain a clear and transparent working relationship with the
RCD-Goma.  Close consultations with MONUC will be maintained during these
negotiations.
OCHA should utilize its advocacy mandate to bring systematic international
attention to the humanitarian situation in Ituri to ensure that the cycle of
violence is arrested. 
Donors, UN agencies and NGO need to work together to define strategies for
addressing the evolving situation in the east, and to mobilize the financial and
human resources necessary to meet expanding needs. As part of this
approach, a core group should be formed in Kinshasa to chart strategies and
develop priorities.
To ensure it can fully play its coordination role, the OCHA team should be
strengthened immediately through the use of surge capacity mechanisms.  At
the same time, we must expedite the recruitment and deployment of staff for
our newly-created positions.
Given the increasing linkages between MONUC and UN agencies on the
DDRRR issue, it would be useful to reconstitute the DRC Task Force at
Headquarters (chaired by DPKO) to ensure that New York remains closely
engaged with developments.
Negotiations on the Memorandum of Understanding between OCHA and
MONUC should be concluded as soon as possible.
OCHA and the humanitarian community as a whole should continue to expand
its use of Radio Okapi.
OCHA needs to determine how to proceed with its support to the Goma
Volcano Observatory to ensure that the progress of the last eight months is not
lost. 
The New Situation in Eastern DRC1
13. The mission occurred at a crucial moment in the evolution of the conflict in the
DRC. Several important towns and significant amounts of territory in eastern
DRC changed hands and some possible new alliances began to emerge.
These changes occurred in the context of a major humanitarian emergency,
and present both opportunities and challenges to the humanitarian community
in the DRC. The situation remains extremely fluid and subject to further
developments.
14. For the last four years, the key factor in the military/political situation in eastern
DRC has been the presence of the Rwandan and Ugandan troops. Each force
supported various rebel groups, although alliances have often shifted. Rwanda
supported the RCD-Goma who until recently controlled the area roughly
                                                
1 The information in this report was current as of 20 October 2002, but have become outdated due to the fluid
situation on the ground. 
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bounded by Goma, Kisangani, Kindu and Kalemie. Uganda has supported
several rebel movements during the period, including Jean-Pierre Bemba’s
MLC, which controls Equateur Province and through Roger Lumbala RCD-N,
western Orientale Province, Mbusa Nyamwisi’s RCD-K/ML, which currently
controls the area around Beni and Butembo, and Thomas Lubanga’s UPC,
which controls the area in and around Bunia town. The military support of their
foreign backers was a crucial element in the survival (and multiplication) of the
rebel movements.
15. In April 2002, the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in Sun City, which included the
Government, the main rebel movements, opposition parties and civil society,
reached a partial agreement.  The RCD-Goma were the only major rebel
group who refused to sign this agreement. However, they have continued their
discussions with the Government, supported by the good offices of the SG’s
Special Envoy, Moustapha Niasse. In July and August 2002, the Government
concluded two separate peace agreements with Rwanda (the Pretoria
Agreement) and Uganda (the Luanda Agreement), which included provisions
for the withdrawal of their troops. While there was initially skepticism as to
whether these agreements would ever be implemented, Rwanda began to
withdraw their troops in September and Uganda stepped up its withdrawal
which had begun several months earlier. Rwanda now claims to have
withdrawn all of its troops (some 23,000) while Uganda has withdrawn all but
2,000 troops in Bunia and several hundred troops on the western slopes of the
Rwenzori Mountains.  The continued Ugandan presence in Bunia is at the
request of the Security Council, who had feared a serious security vacuum if
they departed precipitously, while the presence in Rwenzori is to counter the
ADF rebels fighting against the Government of Uganda.
16. The withdrawals have led to very different outcomes.  In the areas controlled
by the RCD-Goma, the Rwandan withdrawal has led to major advances by
Mayi Mayi traditional fighters who have been battling against the presence of
the Rwandans. As a result, the Mayi Mayi now control key towns such as
Shabunda, Fizi, and Walikale.2  RCD-Goma appears to have pulled back its
forces to major towns such as Kisangani, Kindu, and Goma in order to
reinforce Bukavu in the face of these Mayi Mayi advances. The RCD-Goma
and the Rwandese Government have publicly accused the Government of the
DRC of providing military support for these advances.    
17. The Mayi Mayi are not a coherent unified force with a centralized command
and control structure.  They are better thought of as a collection of like-minded
groups, with strong links to specific geographic areas and ethnic groups.
Historically, the first emergence of the Mayi Mayi groups was during the
numerous rebellions in eastern DRC during the mid-1960s, and they have
generally acted in opposition to the imposition of external authority, whether
from the Government in Kinshasa or external forces.  While some Mayi Mayi
participated in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (chosen by their respective
allies), it has always been difficult to determine who was a “real” representative
of these groups.  Furthermore, contacts between the Mayi Mayi and
                                                
2 The Mayi Mayi also controlled the town of Uvira for several days in mid-October, but it was re-occupied by the
RCD-Goma on 19 October.
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humanitarian organizations have been strongly discouraged by RCD-Goma,
although it has been possible to make indirect contacts with some leaders. As
a consequence, in many areas the Mayi Mayi remain an unknown quantity for
the humanitarian community.  It is important to note that most Mayi Mayi
groups are currently linked to the Government, while a smaller number have
been linked to RCD-Goma and Rwanda, and RCD-K/ML.
18. The Mayi Mayi advances have also led to different actions by the local
populations. In areas where the Mayi Mayi are linked to the ethnic groups in a
location that they are entering, the population does not flee, or returns quickly
if it did move (i.e., Shabunda). Where Mayi Mayi forces represent a different
ethnic group or are mixed with the foreign armed groups, the population will
flee and not return (i.e., Banyamulenge from Uvira).
19. The Ugandan withdrawal from north-eastern DRC has been ongoing for some
months. The consequences of the Ugandan withdrawal have been less
prominent than the consequences of their continued presence in Bunia. For
the last three years, the area around Bunia (Ituri District) has been
characterized by an intensifying spiral of violence between the Hema
(supported by the Gegere) and the Lendu (supported by the Ngiti). Although
this conflict reflects long-standing inter-ethnic rivalries, it has been largely re-
ignited by cynical political manipulations linked to economic interests.
Elements of the Ugandan military have been implicated in these
developments, and are alleged to have armed some Hema militias (those now
led by Thomas Lubanga of the UPC), and to a much lesser extent some Lendu
militias.  Both sides have been accused of conducting increasing larger
massacres and atrocities against the other.  The UPC now control the town of
Bunia, where the Hema community has increasingly concentrated itself, and
Mahagi and Aru.  Lendu militias control the areas around the town, and it is
almost impossible to travel between the two areas.  The highly politicized and
violent environment was tragically illustrated by the deliberate murder of six
ICRC staff members in April 2001. At the current moment, there are deep
fears within the humanitarian, human rights and donor communities that the
conflict could explode into major waves of ethnic cleansing.
The Humanitarian Consequences
20. For OCHA, the task is to analyze these developments in terms of their
humanitarian consequences.  Although some general conclusions can be
drawn, it is also important to understand crucial differences at the provincial
and sub-provincial levels.
North Kivu
21. Many regions of North Kivu, most notably Masisi, Rutshuru, Lubero and
Walikale, have been occupied by ex-FAR/Interhamwe elements since 1994.
The area is also home to a number of Mayi Mayi groups. Their presence has
resulted in repeated fighting between these actors and the Rwanda Army/
RCD-Goma. Since the withdrawal of the Rwandan troops, there has been little
change in the situation on the ground, although the amount of fighting is
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reported to have diminished, perhaps by the setting up of a well-organized
local militia under the control of the Governor.  Access to populations in need
remains very limited due to insecurity, but humanitarian programmes are
continuing.   
22. The area around Beni and Butembo is under the control of the RCD-K/ML and
remains relatively calm.  There are some indications from ex-FAR/Interhamwe
groups that they are willing to participate in the DDRRR programme (see
DDRRR section). The main humanitarian emergency at present is the situation
of approximately 60,000 people who have been recently displaced from the
Bunia area.  Only two international NGOs, World Vision and CESVI are active
in the response, although WFP is currently undertaking an exploratory mission
in the area and other organizations are now expressing interest following
reports from OCHA.  I met with World Vision in Beni and was very impressed
by the dedication and professionalism of their staff.
 
South Kivu
23. Humanitarian access in South Kivu, already very limited, has diminished
significantly since the Rwandan withdrawal.  International and national
organizations have evacuated Shabunda and Uvira in advance of the Mayi
Mayi. Threats to Bukavu have reduced movements outside the town.
Prospects for improvement in access throughout the province are largely
negative.  South Kivu is home to a wide range of armed groups, including
different Mayi Mayi groups (one of whom had signed an agreement with
Rwanda), Burundian rebels, and Banyamulenge forces opposed to the
Rwanda and RCD-Goma.  Conflicts between these groups in the absence of
Rwanda and the RCD-Goma should be expected.  On the other hand, one
possibly positive piece of news is that the Mayi Mayi leader in Shabunda has
sent a message to the international NGOs who had evacuated, asking them to
return and promising them a secure environment.  An inter-agency mission
was able to visit Shabunda on 12 October, followed by a MONUC visit on 16
October. They confirmed that the Mayi Mayi leadership there claims to be
open to facilitating humanitarian action. However, it should be noted that this is
one of the groups who have been accused of repeated acts of sexual violence
against women living in the outskirts of Shabunda.
Maniema
24. Humanitarian access to most parts of Maniema has been seriously limited for
months. Only a handful of NGOs operate in this area. The town of Kindu which
is held by the RCD-Goma but surrounded by Mayi Mayi, is home to 41,000
displaced people, of whom 11,000 arrived in recent weeks.  Access to food in
the town is extremely poor as the normal trade in food has been severely
restricted by the Mayi Mayi encirclement. The situation is becoming more
fragile and violent and there is a concern that the humanitarian situation could
deteriorate in the near future.
Katanga
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25. The situation in northern Katanga has not changed significantly since the
Rwandan withdrawal.  Access remains relatively limited to key towns (Kalemie,
Nyunzu, Kabalo, Manono, Kongolo), which could be threatened by Mayi Mayi
and ex-Far/Interhamwe troops.  Further south in Government-held areas, there
are concerns that indications of warlordism and fighting between different Mayi
Mayi groups could worsen the situation.
Orientale
26. The situation in Ituri is already a humanitarian catastrophe. More than 500,000
people have been displaced during the last three years. In the last two months,
at least 60,000 people have moved south towards the area around Beni.  The
town of Bunia is encircled and the few humanitarian actors there cannot move
more than five kilometers outside the town. 18,000 families have been
displaced within the town in recent months. There is a limited amount of
humanitarian action in the area around Mahagi near the Ugandan border, but
access remains precarious. WFP has food for Bunia in Mahagi but it is
impossible to transport it to Bunia at this time. If the cycle of violence between
the Hema and Lendu communities is not broken, we will likely continue to
witness mass killings and further displacement.  We were told horrific accounts
of the attack, allegedly by Ngiti militias, on the town of Nyakunde in early
September that resulted in anywhere from 200 to 1000 deaths.  Patients in the
hospital were targeted and killed, and there are numerous accounts of
atrocities and mutilations, including of children. An Ituri Pacification
Committee, chaired by MONUC and involving the Governments of DRC and
Uganda, has been formed with the hope of finding a solution to the crisis. 
27. In a separate conflict involving the MLC/RCD-N and RCD-K/ML, fighting near
Mambasa is resulting in displacement towards Beni.
28. In Kisangani, the RCD-Goma remains in control of the town, but the
humanitarian community there is unable to move more than 25 kilometres
outside the town.
General Conclusions
29. Five conclusions can be drawn from these detailed accounts. First, there are
already signs of a worsening humanitarian situation, and the presence of risk
factors that make a further deterioration seem a likely scenario.
30. Second, the events of the last two months have resulted in a multiplication of
the number of possible interlocutors on the ground. To work in areas controlled
by the Mayi Mayi, the humanitarian community will have to proceed town by
town to meet the new “authorities” and to develop a principled framework for
engagement with them. New contacts will need to be carefully tested before
humanitarian activities can be started (or re-started). The risks inherent in this
fragmentation of authority should not be underestimated. In addition, the
access strategy will need to be closely coordinated with MONUC, who will be
seeking contacts with the same people for their own purposes.
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31. Third, it is likely that we will see contradictory trends on the ground. In some
areas, contacts with Mayi Mayi will lead to new programmes and new
opportunities to work in previously inaccessible areas. In other areas, conflicts
between Mayi Mayi groups may develop, leading to warlordism and the
attendant risks for the safety of the population and humanitarian personnel, as
well as restrictions in humanitarian access.
32. Fourth, the approach of the RCD-Goma towards the desire of humanitarian
agencies to work in Mayi Mayi-controlled areas can either facilitate or seriously
hamper humanitarian action.  During my meeting with RCD-Goma Secretary-
General, M. Ruberwa, the RCD-Goma reiterated reservations about contacts
with Mayi Mayi groups, based on security factors and a concern about
legitimizing these groups.  We forcefully rebutted these reservations. If the
RCD-Goma continues to object to these contacts, even with those who have
offered safe passage to humanitarian actors, access will be even more
seriously restricted than at present, and the already grave condition of the
population will worsen. The RCD-Goma expressed readiness in principle to set
up a framework for discussion of access on a case-by-case basis. It will be
essential to actively follow up on this opening.  However, if the alleged links
between the Government and the Mayi Mayi are confirmed and become
strong, the problem of negotiating access with the RCD-Goma should not be
underestimated.
33. Fifth, the capacity of humanitarian organizations must increase if we are to
cope with the new situation.  As SRSG Ngongi commented to us, “when we
get into new areas, it will be worse than expected. We are only seeing the tip
of the iceberg.” Some NGOs confirmed that they intend to increase
programming, but indicated that finding suitable and willing staff was a major
constraint.
Constraints on Humanitarian Action
34. The humanitarian community faces significant constraints in its attempts to
meet the needs in the DRC. First, the country is huge and the infrastructure is
extremely poor. Roads are often unusable even where they are safe. This
translates into a reliance on expensive air operations. While some UN
agencies and NGOs have been willing and able to make use of MONUC’s air
assets, they are constrained by MONUC’s own requirements and limited flight
schedules. ECHO has committed to expanding its free air services, and the
NGO Airserv operates four airplanes in eastern DRC on a very reasonable
cost recovery basis, but all other travel and transportation requires expensive
private providers.
35. A second constraint is the availability of suitable and willing staff.  NGO
partners indicated that they would like to increase the scale of their operations,
but find it difficult to find sufficient numbers of experienced French-speaking
staff. UN agencies reportedly face similar problems.
 
36. A third element is the need to increase the strategic direction of the
humanitarian effort. While information-sharing meetings occur in many
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locations and at different levels, there is a need to complement these meetings
with a more strategic approach. This will allow the community to maximize its
collaboration and use of scarce resources. Contingency planning should also
be a part of this effort. This can be addressed by establishing strategic
humanitarian coordination mechanisms that combines the IASC and the Donor
Contact Group.  Herbert M’cleod has initiated discussions on this approach in
Kinshasa
Restructuring Humanitarian Coordination
37. I had a useful meeting with the donor community as a group, followed by
separate meetings with OFDA/USAID and ECHO. I briefed them on our
reaction to the multi-donor mission and the actions we have taken to date.
There was strong appreciation for our response and our plans to deploy
additional staff in the DRC.  In this regard, I expressed my appreciation for the
fact that their requests for change had been supported by the financial
resources necessary for OCHA to implement these changes. 
38. The donors also expressed their concerns about the deteriorating situation,
and pressed OCHA to both speed up the deployment of newly recruited staff
and encourage the UN agencies and the NGOs to increase the scope and
scale of their activities in eastern DRC.  In response, I challenged them to
increase their levels of assistance and noted that the 2002 CAP remained
woefully under-funded. There is a pressing need to ensure that future CAPs
are based on shared understanding of the situation and a shared commitment
to address the needs.
39. The UN Country Team also expressed its acceptance of the recommendations
of the Multi-Donor report, and has developed a Plan of Action to implement the
recommendations. The transfer of responsibility for provincial coordination has
already taken place in North Kivu since 1 September, and will take place in
Orientale and South Kivu as soon as OCHA’s new international staff are
deployed.
40. Within OCHA, the recruitment of additional international staff is ongoing.
However, it should be clear from the analysis in this report that every effort
should be made to expedite the recruitment and deployment of new staff, as
well as the procurement of the vehicles, communications equipment and other
materials necessary for them to safely carry out their activities as soon as they
arrive. There is also a need for the immediate reinforcement of the existing
team, most notably through the deployment of an Information Officer for
Kinshasa and a Humanitarian Affairs Officer who can support activities in the
east. 
41. As a result of the evolving situation, there is a need for an additional position
for Beni.  We may also wish to re-visit with the donors the idea to eliminate
Goma’s role of a hub for eastern DRC in light of recent developments. While
we may not want to return the office to its former status as the regional office
for the east, it is clear that the sub-office has a crucial role to play in the
collection and dissemination of information and in the facilitation of
10
humanitarian action.  Many of the organizations operational in eastern DRC
use Goma as their base or point of entry into the east.
42. It would not be appropriate to conclude this section without a comment on the
performance of our national and international staff.  During my mission, I have
been deeply impressed by their commitment, energy, engagement, and
knowledge of the context. It is clear from the unsolicited comments of UN
agencies, donors, NGOs and MONUC that our staff have played crucial roles
in furthering humanitarian action, often under extremely arduous and
dangerous conditions. While the restructuring will ultimately help them to do
more to assist populations in need, it should not be taken as a critique of their
efforts to date.
DDRRR
43. The major task in MONUC’s mandate is to oversee the voluntary
disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and reinstallation of
foreign armed groups. The focus on foreign groups makes this unlike any
previous DDR exercise. As yet, MONUC does not have a mandate to
undertake DDRRR for Congolese groups, but will collect and destroy weapons
from any who choose to surrender them. Any DDRRR activities for Congolese
groups will be the responsibility of the Government, UN agencies (especially
UNDP, which has set up Emergency Fund for Congolese combatants) and the
World Bank. The Government will be responsible for disarming and
demobilizing Congolese combatants, while the UN agencies and the World
Bank will handle the reintegration activities. The distinction between foreign
and Congolese combatants may prove problematic as early encounters with
foreign groups have revealed that they are likely to contain both foreign and
Congolese elements. 
44. As it developed its plans for DDRRR, MONUC has called for the assistance of
the UN Agencies and NGOs to operate the transit camps for foreign
combatants and their dependants. MONUC and the UN agencies have
developed a Joint Operations Plan that spells out the respective roles each will
play. It is evident that cooperation between MONUC and the UN agencies has
improved significantly, although there will undoubtedly be issues to be
addressed along the way. 
45. MONUC intends to operate a series of mobile transit camps that will quickly
process and repatriate foreign combatants and their families. The camps for
combatants will be able to process up to 400 people at a time. MONUC
intends to make these camps as simple and austere as possible to avoid
providing an incentive to combatants to remain in them. MONUC has been
approaching UN agencies and NGOs to provide basic services (health,
wat/san, food) in the transit facilities. While both NGOs and UN agencies are
willing to provide these services, both are concerned about the availability of
funding for these activities.  Possible partners want to know where the money
is coming from. Staff security will also be a significant concern.  An associated
complication for those interested in participating in these activities in that
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MONUC is envisioning a very short processing period, but there are no
guarantees that this will be the case.
46. MONUC has made some progress on DDRRR to date.  After more than a year
of wrangling, over 100 Rwandan ex-combatants and their families began
returning to Rwanda from the Kamina camp.  These returns were preceded by
a weeklong visit by 79 combatants and family members to Rwanda. In
MONUC’s opinion, these familiarization visits lay the groundwork for returns,
and help to counter the control and intimidation that exists within the camps.
47. Nonetheless, many questions about DDRRR remain unanswered. The World
Bank has a huge role to play through their $580 million Multi-Donor Regional
Fund, but the speed and flexibility with which their funding can be disbursed is
questioned. As well, planning for the services provided to the families of ex-
combatants is still incomplete.  Finally, the question of DDRRR for Congolese
combatants also needs to be addressed.
48. It would thus be useful to re-activate DPKO’s Task Force on the DRC in New
York. This would allow Secretariat departments and agencies to work together
on DDRRR activities and ensure the coherence of field and headquarters
approaches.
MONUC – OCHA Relations
49. Through Resolution 1291, MONUC was given the mandate to “facilitate
humanitarian assistance.” In response, a Humanitarian Affairs Section was
created in early 2000. However, the tasks assigned to this Section and its
officers were never clarified and the relationship with OCHA has been
uncertain. The recent arrival of Nancee Oku Bright as the Chief of Section has
resulted in significant improvements in the relationship. MONUC’s
Humanitarian Affairs Officers now concentrate on providing a liaison between
the humanitarian community and MONUC, and particularly on facilitation of
logistical assistance. The Section and OCHA now have regular contacts and
information sharing has improved enormously. The Section and OCHA have
also worked together to ensure complementary staff deployment to maximize
the coverage of the DRC. OCHA offices in Kinshasa and Goma have been
connected to the MONUC telephone line communications system, and there
are plans to connect OCHA offices in Kisangani, Kalemie and Bukavu.  Finally,
MONUC and OCHA have been discussing a Memorandum of Understanding
to formalize the relationship.
50. It should be noted that MONUC continues to have an image problem in many
areas, most notably in Kisangani.  There is a desire among some in the
humanitarian community to maintain a certain distance to ensure that the
population does not confuse it with MONUC.  OCHA can continue to play a
role as a bridge between MONUC and the humanitarian community. 
51. One other aspect of MONUC’s activities deserves mention. MONUC, in
cooperation with Fondation Hirondelle, a private Swiss organization, has
established Radio Okapi, the first national radio service in the DRC in a
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decade. Radio Okapi is a real success story and has quickly established a
huge following throughout the country. OCHA makes regular use of Radio
Okapi for disseminating information, as do other humanitarian organizations. It
will be useful to continue and strengthen our usage of Radio Okapi, and to
continue to encourage the humanitarian community to do likewise. 
The Looming HIV/AIDS Crisis
52. I took advantage of my meetings to share information about the impact of the
AIDS crisis in Southern Africa. The Minister of Health, UN agencies and NGOs
all recognized that we have little information about prevalence rates in the
DRC, but that the confluence of poor health service, massive displacement
and the presence of foreign troops from countries with high prevalence rates
are undoubtedly contributing to an environment ripe for the spread of the virus.
It was clear that there is a need to increase both information campaigns and,
where possible, provide treatment. MONUC now has an AIDS advisor on the
Mission’s staff, and MONUC and the UN Country Team need to find a way to
work together to face this looming crisis. Radio Okapi can play a very helpful
role in this effort.
Goma Volcano Activities
53. I visited the Goma Volcano Observatory, supported by donors through OCHA
and Save the Children, where a particularly dedicated group of national
scientists are monitoring the volcanic and seismic activities.  Their monitoring
actions, supported by a rotating group of international experts, have allowed
for better preparedness in the face of a possible volcanic and/or seismic event.
I was concerned to learn that funding is only assured until March 2003.  It will
be important to discuss the extension of existing funds and OCHA’s
management of this project to ensure that the gains of the last eight months
will not be lost.  
The Role of the World Bank
54. One interesting piece of news we received was that the World Bank intends to
expand its activities from Government-controlled areas into the rebel-held
zones in the east.  It is not clear how this will be done or on what time frame,
but it could have useful consequences for economic development and
security.  The Bank has asked OCHA to help it to establish contacts with
relevant actors in the east to facilitate its upcoming mission.  
Prospects for the Future
55. The next few months will be crucial for our ability to address the humanitarian
situation. Key variables we will need to continue monitoring include:
Our ability to respond to an increase of humanitarian needs
The effects of a wider and more robust MONUC presence on the security of
the civilian population
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The progress of the DDRRR programme and its ability to draw out the foreign
armed groups
Rwanda’s reaction if the Mayi Mayi continue to advance in eastern DRC
Additional population movements to Rwanda and Burundi as a result of the
developments in eastern DRC
The reliability of Mayi Mayi leaders as interlocutors for the humanitarian
community
The longer-term humanitarian and human rights consequences of the change
in control of parts of eastern DRC
The possibility of major population movements towards Kinshasa if the country
begins to open up
The progress of the Congolese parties towards an all-inclusive peace
agreement and the process of forming a transitional government
